Abstract-An Ad-hoc Mobile Cloud (AMC) is a new computing model that allows sharing computing power of multiple mobile devices. For a diverse group of individuals that employ such computing model, in an ad-hoc manner, secure peer-topeer communication becomes very important. Using private or pairwise keys to secure such communication is preferable to public-keys because of computation and energy requirements [1] . With the advent of sensor enabled mobile devices, a protocol (SekGens) that uses sensor data to generate pairwise keys on demand has been proposed [2] . To work successfully SekGens requires devices to be closely located and becomes infeasible for devices situated multiple hops away. SekGens is also expensive in computation and slow in key generation. In this paper, we investigate how to enable devices in an AMC to establish pairwise keys. We propose an efficient solution which tries to reduce the number of executions of SekGens in the AMC, and establishes pairwise keys between nodes multiple hops away by distributing parts of the key on multiple routing paths. Our results show a reduction of up to 75% in the number of SekGens required to establish keys in an AMC, when compared to a naive approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices, such as cellphones, tablets, etc. are ubiquitous in today's world. In addition to traditional communication tasks (e.g. phone calls, text messages), modern mobile devices enable more complex services such as mobile social networking, crowdsensing, etc [3] , [4] due to powerful computing, sensing and networking capabilities. An Ad-hoc Mobile Cloud (AMC) is a recently proposed idea, where a collection of mobile devices form a distributed system in an ad hoc manner. Ad-hoc Mobile Cloud is defined here in a different way than traditional cloud computing. It is a collection of mobile devices that are owned by different individuals but collaborate among themselves sharing resources, which benefits all the participants [5] . Several interesting applications have been developed for AMC, including peer-to-peer file sharing, distributed computing [6] , [7] , collaborative data storage and processing [8] , [9] . With an AMC, applications are easy to deploy, highly mobile, and do not rely on infrastructure-based networks.
Although there are multiple advantages for using Ad-hoc Mobile Cloud, it is paramount to establish secure links among peers in an AMC, especially for data sensitive applications. Key establishment for securing device to device communication in ad-hoc networks has been under active research [10] . None of existing solutions use the sensing capability of current mobile devices in generating security keys. In recent work [2] , a protocol (SekGens) uses sensor data gathered from mobile phones to generate a strong cryptographic pairwise key for a pair of nodes within a certain range. Despite its guarantee of generating a strong key for a pair of nodes, the use of SekGens in large networks remains challenging. First, it is impossible for users that are not within a certain range to generate keys with SekGens. Second, generating keys using SekGens takes non-negligible time and thus it is time consuming for a user to use SekGens to generate keys with multiple neighbors sequentially. Considering these two aspects, it is burdensome to use SekGens individually in a network of relatively larger size (∼40-50) nodes.
In this paper, we propose to efficiently establish symmetric keys for all pairs of nodes by minimizing the number of SekGens executions (for nearby neighbors) and by distributing parts of keys through multiple routing paths [11] (for pairs of nodes multiple hops away). Our basic idea is to carefully choose pairs of nodes that are within a certain range to perform SekGens to establish secure links, while other pairs establish the keys by exchanging key fragments over multiple node disjoint paths, whose links are already secured. We analyze the formulated optimization problem and obtain the lower bound. We further show that it is a NP-hard problem even for a simple case. In order to solve the problem efficiently, we develop a heuristic algorithm, SekGens Minimization Algorithm (SMA). We evaluate the proposed algorithm through simulations and show that it reduces the number of SekGens significantly (up to 75%) when compared to non-optimized naive solutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the SekGens and Node-disjoint path key establishment schemes and identifies their drawbacks. In Section III we define the problem formally and discuss the hardness of the optimization problem. Section IV discusses the details of our proposed algorithm for reducing the number of SekGens. In Section V we present the results of our implementation. We mention some related works in Section VI and Section VII concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we introduce the two techniques for pairwise key establishment, namely SekGens and Key Establishment Using Node-Disjoint Paths. We then motivate our research by identifying the drawbacks when each of the techniques is used individually, and the advantages when the two are combined in an efficient manner.
A. Symmetric or Pairwise Key Establishment
Session Key Generated from Sensors (SekGens) algorithm [2] aims at establishing a secure long key (128 bits) between two mobile devices using their contextual information 2015 
978-1-4673-7701-0/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE (i.e., data obtained from device's sensors). SekGens has three phases. In the Quantization Phase, the key is iteratively generated based on different sensor's data. In the Reconciliation Phase, the two mobile devices eliminate minor differences in the bits of their keys by using the Cascade reconciliation mechanism. In the PrivacyAmplication-and-Hashing Phase, the two devices omit all bits exposed during the reconciliation phase and apply hashing to the remaining secret bits to strengthen the key. SekGens was implemented and evaluated by modifying the Android code responsible for WiFi Protected Setup (WPS) protocol in Google Nexus 5 and Samsung Galaxy S2 smartphones. The evaluation results show that SekGens is efficient in generating keys with low mismatch ratio and with high Shannon entropy. [11] proposes the idea of Key Establishment Using NodeDisjoint Paths. The idea is to use node-disjoint paths to secure the negotiation and establishment of a symmetric key between a pair of nodes. Depending on the number of available nodedisjoint paths between a sender and a receiver, the sender divides the key into a fixed number of fragments. Each fragment is then sent along one of the node-disjoint paths. The receiver needs to collect all the fragments in order to recreate the complete key. So an attacker has to compromise at least one node on each of the node-disjoint paths to capture all the fragments to discover the key.
B. Motivation
Even though SekGens proves its efficiency and robustness when it runs on same and different Smartphones that are within a certain distance [2] , it has some limitations in case it is used to establish a key for many nodes in AMC networks (i.e., multi-hop networks). The time needed to establish a key (i.e., 6 seconds) is relatively long and impractical for a large number of nodes. Moreover, due to the requirement of closer distances (i.e., 0, 1.5 or 3 m), called SekGensdistance, between devices preferred by SekGens, it might be inconvenient or even impossible to generate keys for a large number of users. As a result, an efficient pairwise key establishment scheme is required to benefit from SekGens in an AMC.
The Node-disjoint path key establishment scheme has two major limitations. First, it assumes that the key is already generated and it only decides the path for distributing the key fragments. There is a need for generating the actual key with some key generation algorithm in the first place. Secondly, the key fragments can only be forwarded from one node to the next hop neighbor if there already exists a pairwise key between them. So keys need to be established between each neighbor node pair on the node-disjoint paths before the fragments can be securely forwarded from the source to the destination.
An efficient algorithm for key establishment using nodedisjoint paths combined with the key generation capability of SekGens for an AMC is our contribution in this paper. Instead of blindly performing SekGens between all device pairs, we minimize the number of SekGens based on the network size, number of key fragments and node density. We present experimental results with respect to risk of key being compromised and required number of SekGens performed for a network using varying number of node-disjoint paths.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS
In this section we describe the system model and formulate the problem mathematically.
A. System Description System Model: Consider an Ad-hoc Mobile Cloud (AMC) having a collection of N mobile phones, {v 1 , v 2 , ..., v N }. The AMC is modelled as a graph G = (V, E), where V (G) is the set of vertices, i.e. phones and E(G) is the set of edges. An edge e = (v i , v j ) ∈ E(G), implies v i and v j are within SekGens-distance. G is the connectivity graph. The goal is to establish pairwise keys between all N devices.
There are two ways to establish key between any pair, SekGens and Node-disjoint path key generation. For any v i and v j , if there exists a e = (v i , v j ) ∈ E(G), then we can use SekGens. We can use Node-disjoint path key generation also between v i and v j if there are adequate number of such paths between them, which we explain in the next paragraph.
As mentioned in [11] to avoid the per hop key exposure problem, a key needs to be broken into k fragments and sent over k node-disjoint paths, where k ≥ 2. The receiver needs to receive all k fragments in order to recreate the key. We introduce parameter k as Key Fragment Factor (KFF) in our model.
Adversary Model:
The adversary is a single or a group of malicious device(s), who wish to discover the key(s) that is being established between device pair(s) in the AMC. For an adversary to recreate the key, it has to compromise one node on each of the k paths. We focus on inside attacker only, as such devices have easy access to the key being exchanged. The attacker is only a passive entity. It does not jam the communication medium. Also the attacker does not modify the data it is entrusted to communicate or forward to other device, since data manipulation makes the attack an active one and we consider only passive attacker model in our system.
Assumptions:
We make the following assumptions,
• We assume that the users use mobile devices that support at least one sensor. Sensor data is required to generate the keys whenever required.
• Two nodes can perform SekGens only if they are within the SekGens-distance.
• The communication of the key fragments over the node-disjoint paths takes less time than performing SekGens between two devices.
• There is no inherent vulnerability in the mobile devices themselves. That is the devices are not infected with malware a priori which could manipulate the key fragments.
• A node is able to generate cryptographic key from already stored sensor data and break it into required number of fragments, when required for use in nodedisjoint path key establishment.
• The topology of G does not change while our key establishment algorithm is running.
B. Problem Formulation
For N vertices in the connectivity graph G we need
pairwise keys. It is trivial to notice that when G is a complete graph, each device can perform SekGens with every other node, but it is inefficient. It is possible to reduce the number of execution of SekGens by replacing some of these SekGens by node-disjoint paths to distribute the key fragments instead.
We formulate the problem as the following optimization problem:
Given a connectivity graph G and a KFF k, decide on the devices that should perform SekGens so as to minimize the number of executions of SekGens while establishing pairwise key for all (u, v) ∈ (V (G) × V (G)).
C. Problem Analysis
In this subsection, we discuss the characteristics of the optimization problem. Before going into the details of our algorithm we present some properties that the connectivity graph G should possess for a feasible solution and argue on the hardness of the problem.
1) Feasibility:
Feasibility is defined as the requirements that the system model needs to meet for generating pairwise keys for all nodes in a given connectivity graph G and for the specified KFF value k. The connectivity graph needs to have certain properties and the nodes must be able to perform some minimum number of SekGens individually, for the solution proposed later in the paper to work. We explain them and argue their necessity below.
We discuss the Lemma(s) and Theorem below for a connectivity graph where the KFF value k = 2, is the requirement. Afterwards we generalize it for k > 2 cases. Lemma 1. For a given connectivity graph G and any vertex pair v i and v j , both v i and v j need to perform at least two SekGens each to use node-disjoint paths to establish key.
Proof: Let P 1 and P 2 be two node disjoint paths between vertices v i and v j . Let P 1 = {v i , v 11 , v 12 , ..., v j } and P 2 = {v i , v 21 , v 22 , ..., v j }. Since we claim that P 1 and P 2 are node disjoint paths between v i and v j , therefore
Hence none of the nodes that occurs on one path can occur on the other for the pair of nodes v i and v j . This implies that v i must perform SekGens with v 11 and v 21 and they are distinct vertices. This is necessary because the key needs to be broken into at least two fragments and sent over two node-disjoint paths. Similarly v j must perform two SekGens with the last node on the two paths.
Before presenting the next Lemma, we introduce a basic graph theory concept. In graph theory, a biconnected graph is a connected and nonseparable graph, meaning that if any vertex were to be removed, the graph will remain connected. Therefore a biconnected graph has no articulation or cut vertices.
Lemma 2. For a given connectivity graph G, to find two nodedisjoint paths between every pair of vertices v i and v j , G must be biconnected.
Proof: Consider the graph in Figure 1 (a).The vertex X is a cut vertex or articulation point for the graph, since the removal of vertex X would increase the number of connected components. Let G 1 and G 2 be the two subgraphs of the original graph G that are created on removing X. In the original graph G, for any two nodes v i and v j , such that v i ∈ G 1 and v j ∈ G 2 , a path from
To find two such paths that are node-disjoint is not possible in G for such v i and v j , since the node X will be present on all such paths. By the assumption on our connectivity graph, such a topology will not be supported by our algorithm. The statements of Lemma 1 and 2 must be satisfied for all connectivity graphs where k = 2 is the KFF value.
2) Hardness: We show the hardness of the optimization problem and prove that it is reducible to a known NP-hard problem, for the case of k = 2. Hence for the general case k the problem is also NP-hard. Proof: To show that the minimum number of SekGens for k = 2 cannot be less than N , lets assume that the minimum number of SekGens for G is N − 1 and then show a contradiction. The claim is that after performing N − 1 SekGens each node will have two unique node disjoint paths with every other node. If we start with N disconnected nodes and connect the pairs that perform SekGens, we get a graph, G = (V , E ) that has |V | = N nodes and |E | = N − 1 edges. By [12] , if G is connected and |V | = |E | + 1, then every two nodes of G are joined by only one unique, that is node-disjoint path. So there cannot be two node-disjoint paths between non neighbor nodes in G . Therefore for N node graph the number of SekGens has to be greater than or equal to N .
For the equality condition, we claim that for G the minimum number of SekGens is N . Let G be the graph with N nodes and N edges where each edge denotes SekGens has been performed between the neighbors. We need to show that G is a Hamiltonian Cycle of G. G will have 2 node disjoint paths between every pair of node that did not perform SekGens, only then will those node be able to establish key using nodedisjoint path. We remove one of the edges, e = (u, v) from G . Since there was 2 node-disjoint paths before the edge was removed, there should still be 1 node-disjoint path between every pair in the new graph, which we call G . So G is connected and |V (G )| = |E(G )| + 1. By [12] , G has to be acyclic and if the removed edge, e = (u, v) is added back, where u and v were non-adjacent in G , since we had removed the edge between them, the resulting graph has exactly one cycle. This new graph is actually G since e was removed from G to obtain G and was added back. So G has N nodes and N edges. From definition, G is then a Hamiltonian Cycle for G. Now assume that G is Hamiltonian and prove the equality condition. Let the graph G be Hamiltonian and assume G is the corresponding Hamiltonian Cycle of G. So G is a graph with N nodes and N edges. Every non neighbor node on G has two node-disjoint paths between them. Hence performing SekGens between nodes that are connected by an edge on G will be enough. Since these N nodes of G are actually the same nodes in G, this will be the least number of SekGens for G, which is equal to the number of nodes N .
Using the result from Theorem 3, for the case of k = 2, the problem of determining the minimum number of SekGens, is equivalent to finding the Hamiltonian Cycle for the connectivity graph. The Hamiltonian Cycle problem is a known NPcomplete problem [13] . Hence for k = 2, if we can find the minimum number of SekGens for G, we are able to find the Hamiltonian Cycle, if it exists. Hence our problem is reducible to the Hamiltonian Cycle problem.
3) General k Value: The Lemma and Theorem stated earlier are for the case of k = 2. We generalize them for k > 2 case.
For k > 2 case, for the key to be broken into k fragments there needs to be k number of node-disjoint paths from the source to the destination. Using the reason of Lemma 1, to have k node-disjoint paths the source needs to perform at least k SekGens, with k neighbors.
For having k node-disjoint paths between a source and a destination node the connectivity graph should be k-connected. This requirement ensures that the algorithm used to find nodedisjoint paths, will find k such paths. This is the generalized version of Lemma 2.
Using Theorem 3, for k = 2, we showed that the problem is reducible to a known NP-complete problem. So for k > 2 the problem becomes harder.
Therefore we propose a heuristic algorithm for solving this optimization problem in the next section.
IV. SEKGENS MINIMIZATION ALGORITHM (SMA)
In this section we propose our algorithm to establish keys between pairs of devices while trying to minimize the number of SekGens for the network.
A. Main Idea
The basic idea is to select neighbors v i and v j at each iteration and run SekGens between them, such that it helps other pairs to use node-disjoint paths to distribute their key, using the edge (v i ,v j ) that is already secured. This will allow those pairs to send key fragments on those secured paths and establish key between them. Here we are greedy in choosing a pair which is the best choice at that iteration, with the hope that it will minimize the total number of SekGens for the complete network. We continue doing this until all pairs have keys between them. Our algorithm determines the best pairs to perform SekGens for a given connectivity graph. We present this idea algorithmically in the next subsection.
B. SekGens Minimization Algorithm (SMA)
Initialize counter i = 0
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F e ← F e + 1 18: Sort F in descending order of edge importance value Algorithm 1 determines how many times an edge occurs on some node-disjoint path in G. This is recorded as the Importance-Value for that edge. It uses an existing NodeDisjoint path finding algorithm (NDPAlgorithm) [13] and calculates all the node-disjoint paths between each device pair (lines 1-2). The paths that are at least of length 2 are usable for sending key fragments. This is because two neighbors cannot communicate a key fragment securely between them unless they already have a key between them. So if v i and v j want to establish a key, the edge e = (v i , v j ) if exists cannot be used by them. The algorithm checks for such paths and deletes the ineligible paths (lines 3-8). It then checks if there are the required k number of node-disjoint paths between the node pair and stores such pair (line 9-10). This is used to decide whether this pair can use node-disjoint paths with the specified KFF of k to establish key. It then computes the importance value of each edge in the graph by accumulating the number of times the edge occurs on a node-disjoint path between some source S and some destination D (lines [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . The algorithm then arranges the edges in a decreasing sequence of their relative importance and maintains it as queue (line 18), that is used by Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 decides the pairs that will use SekGens and the ones that are going to use node-disjoint paths for key 2015 
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establishment. This is done by greedily choosing an edge in each iteration with the hope that securing this pair will benefit the most. Initially all pairs are insecure, i. e. there does not exist a key between them. The algorithm adds each pair to a set (U), called the insecure set and initializes an empty set (S) that contains all the pairs that have established a key between them (line 1-3). It also initializes a timer (t) and a set (Q), called Schedule Maintainer, to keep track of the method that will be used to establish key between a particular pair (lines 4-5). In each iteration it dequeues the most important edge, e (line 7). It deletes the pair that makes up that edge from U and F (line 8). It adds that pair to the secure set S (line 9). The end vertices of e will perform SekGens, which is recorded in Q (line 11). Each element of Q is of the form (v i , v j , 0/1), which denotes that node v i and v j should perform SekGens if the third entry in the tuple is 1, otherwise they use nodedisjoint path to establish key. It then looks for all pairs that are still insecure (line 12) and have edge e on a path in their node-disjoint path set (line 13). If such a pair is found, then it checks if that pair has all its paths in its path set, have edges that have a key on them (line [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] ). If such a pair is found, then it adds that pair to S and also recording in Q that nodedisjoint path is to be used for key establishment between them, by setting the third entry in the tuple as 0 (line 28-32). The algorithm terminates when F becomes empty and also all the pairs are secured, i. e. U becomes empty (line 33).
C. SekGens Minimization Algorithm Example
To demonstrate the execution of our algorithm, consider the connectivity graph of Figure 2 (f)
Fig. 2: Example Graph (G) and intermediate steps to illustrate SekGens Minimization Algorithm
G has 5 nodes and 6 edges. In the naive approach we perform SekGens on all possible pairs. It will still not be possible for pairs like (1, 4) to establish a key, since they are not within SekGens-distance. We assume that the KFF parameter is k = 2, that is two node-disjoint paths are sufficient to send key fragments between any node pair. Using the NDPAlgorithm in Edge Importance-Value Calculator, we get the following nodedisjoint paths between the node pairs as shown in Table I . Only paths that are at least of length 2 can be used to send Table II and also Figure 2 (b) to edges in G based on the number of time it occurs in some node-disjoint path using the data from Table I . The Importance-Value of the edges (2, 3), (1, 2) and (0, 1) are maximum and equal, so Schedule Generator algorithm picks one of them first. It marks SekGens to be performed between those two vertices, which is denoted by dotted line in Figure 2 (c). Now (2, 3) are secured. It then checks for pairs that use this edge on any of its node-disjoint paths. It finds such pairs, like (1, 3) , but it will see that none of the pairs have all the links on their path set secured, meaning a key fragment cannot be forwarded securely from the source to the destination node. It then takes the next important edge, which is (1, 2) . The node pair (1, 2) perform SekGens, as shown in Figure 2(d) . It does the same check as before, but fails to find any such pair that can use paths that are secured on each link from the source to the destination. The algorithm proceeds like this until it reaches the situation in Figure 2 (e). Now it can find two node-disjoint paths between all the non-neighbor nodes and also between the neighbors (0, 3) and uses node-disjoint paths to establish the rest of the keys. So in the Figure 2(f) , the edges represent that the nodes have a pairwise key between each one of them. The dotted edges signify SekGens was used for key establishment and the solid lined edges signify use of node-disjoint paths. For the given G, we could establish all the keys between each pair with 5 SekGens.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we present the performance evaluation of our SekGens Minimization Algorithm. We evaluate our algorithm based on the parameters that model the possible network and user requirements. In each case we plot the number of SekGens performed against one of the parameters.
• Network Size (N): We vary the number of nodes in the graph to study this parameter. It reflects whether our algorithm reduces the number of SekGens that would otherwise be required for a group of mobile phones without using any optimization. The increasing number of nodes shows the scalability issue of SekGens that we identified as one of its major drawbacks.
• Node Density (r): Node density depends on the number of neighbors that a node has. The value of r actually is the SekGens-distance. This parameter helps to understand how our algorithm performs as the density of the devices in the network changes. With more nodes within one hop, meaning denser network, our algorithm should be judicious in choosing the optimal number of neighbors to perform SekGens with. We study how many SekGens are performed as the number of neighbors for each device increases or decreases.
• Key Fragment Factor (k): We defined the number of fragments the key is broken into as the KFF, as more the number of fragments the more difficult it becomes for an adversary to compromise the key. Generating more fragments implies we need to find more node-disjoint paths. As the number of required paths increases it takes more SekGens in securing all the links on such paths before we can use the node-disjoint solution of distributing the key to the destination. We expect a positive correlation between k and the number of SekGens.
The simulation environment we use for testing our algorithm is by generating random geometric graphs (RGG) using the python library "python-igraph" [14] and measuring the number of SekGens value in them. We compare our algorithm's performance with the Naive-algorithm and Random-algorithm.
The Naive-algorithm does not use any optimization or decision on choosing pairs to perform SekGens. It just performs SekGens between every pair that are neighbors. So the number of SekGens in all its applications on all graphs are equal to the number of edges in the graph.
The Random-algorithm uses a random number generator in each iteration to decide on an edge to perform SekGens between its end nodes. After each such SekGens it however checks to see if it can satisfy the required k end to end secured node-disjoint paths for any pair. If it can find such a pair it uses node-disjoint paths to establish key between those pairs. 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Figure 3 shows the number of SekGens that are performed with the different network sizes. We construct the test networks by randomly placing N nodes in a two dimensional unit square and connecting two nodes if they are closer to each other than a given radius, which is actually the SekGens-distance in the graphs. We used the values for parameters r = 0.8 and k = 3 in all these simulation. We get different but similar trends in the number of SekGens using other r and k values. The plots show the average number of SekGens that are performed for the network sizes, N ∈ {10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50} with a confidence of 95%. Compared to the Naive and Random algorithm our SMA algorithm performs consistently better as the network size increases. For example in a 50 node network, the Naive algorithm performs SekGens on all the edges, resulting in more than 1000 SekGens and Random performs close to 800 SekGens. Whereas our SMA algorithm needs about 250 SekGens, which is about 75% less and about 65% less than the number of SekGens performed by Naive and Random algorithm respectively. Figure 4 shows the results when the network size is kept constant, but the node density is varied. This is achieved by changing the SekGens-distance value. With larger SekGensdistance r, a node has more neighbors to possibly perform 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 SekGens and hence more possibility of executing higher number of SekGens. We kept the network size fixed at N = 40 and KFF parameter at k = 3, which again with other values will give similar results. SMA performs significantly better compared to the other two. One interesting trend is observed in the results though. Intuitively, it is expected that as the number of neighbors of a node increases, SMA should have increasing value for number of SekGens. The results show that the number of SekGens increases till a certain density (here r = 0.55) and then falls slightly as the graph becomes denser. The reason behind this trend is, for sparse graph there is anyway less neighbors to do SekGens with, hence the lesser value. As the graph becomes dense more paths are available to distribute the keys using node-disjoint paths and SMA ends up being greedy and performs some redundant SekGens. As the node's degree increases further, even though more node-disjoint paths are found, there are shorter length paths available. Since SMA prefers shorter paths, the number of SekGens goes down slightly compared to less dense graphs but with longer length paths between pairs. with varying key fragments Figure 5 captures the performance of the Random and SMA algorthms as the parameter for number of node-disjoint paths, i. e. KFF k between pairs is changed. We fix the network size to N = 40 and SekGens-Distance r = 0.7. We did not show the values for the Naive Algorithm, since it will be equal to the number of edges for all the k values. SMA's performance is clearly better than the Random Algorithm and keeps the total SekGens value at almost 50% of what the Random approach gives, when k is varied from 2 to 8. [11] proposes an analytical model for quantifying the risk, denoted as r involved in using a set of s node-disjoint paths to establish key between two nodes. For a network of n devices, with x of them being adversary or malicious devices that collude among themselves, the probability of the key being discovered for a single pair is given by,
B. Security Risk vs Number of SekGens
where P i is one of the s node-disjoint paths and l i is the intermediate hop count of path P i . We simulate graphs with n = 20 nodes, where x = 16 nodes are malicious and vary the KFF parameter k on these graphs and study the risk, calculated using Equation (1) . We measure the corresponding number of SekGens for each k value. Intuitively, as the number of node-disjoint paths increases the risk of key getting revealed to an adversary should reduce, since more number of nodes need to be compromised to gather all the key fragments. Likewise as the number of node-disjoint paths increases, as we saw in Figure 5 the number of SekGens will also increase. We calculated the average security risk for a pair of nodes for each k value and the corresponding number of SekGens performed in the network and present it in Figure 6 . It is clear from the figure that as the number of fragments or k value increases, the risk or probability of key being compromised decreases, while the required number of SekGens increases. With more number of SekGens, the time establish pairwise keys between all the devices will also increase. Thus depending on the risk and time expenditure thresholds, a practical deployment of our solution 2015 IEEE WiMob) will need to have some trade-off that the users need to decide. To keep the risk of key compromise low, we have to divide the key into more fragments and the users in the AMC need to perform more SekGens, hence spend more time in establishing pairwise keys among all the devices.
VI. RELATED WORK
The problem that we are solving here is unique and specific to the use of the SekGens [2] for an AMC. It relates to key establishment problem studied in wireless sensor networks. Previous research has shown that generation and use of public keys are computationally costly and research [15] - [17] has shown that it is not suitable for mobile devices which have a limited battery life. Pair-wise key is the preferable solution for such mobile networks.
The Random Key Pre-distribution proposed by Eschenauer and Gligor [18] uses pre loading nodes with a certain number of keys chosen at random from a larger pool of keys. After deployment two nodes within communication range exchange key-identifiers or challenges to discover common keys. Node pairs without common key establish a key through a secure path. Drawback of this way of key establishment is that the key gets exposed on each intermediate node to the destination, which has been called the per-hop key exposure problem in [11] . Another drawback is the requirement of pre-loading keys on each node without knowing what is the network topology and the context where the device is going to be used.
To address the per hop key exposure problem [11] proposed using multiple node-disjoint paths to establish pairwise keys between non-neighbor nodes. Based on these paths, the pair-wise key is divided into multiple fragments, each of which is transmitted along one of the established secure paths. The solution works in combination with existing key predistribution scheme. Our solution is based on the same idea, but we are solving an optimization problem that takes help of this scheme in reducing the number of SekGens for a network.
VII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
Generation of on demand pairwise key in an ad-hoc network composed of mobile phones is advantageous in real world scenarios like disaster area, battle field, under developed communities, etc where infrastructure network is not available or unreliable. Using sensor data to generate such key is an innovative idea. However the existing solution does not scale over more than a pair of mobile devices.
In this paper we proposed a solution that can generate on demand pairwise keys through efficient use of SekGens for an Ad-hoc Mobile Cloud. For a dense network where each user might have to perform SekGens with every other device in the worst case, our solution reduces it to less than 50% of the theoretical maximum value. For sparse network, where SekGens completely fails for devices that are not neighbors, our solution is able to enable key establishment for such devices.
Instead of the centralized approach that is taken in this paper, a distributed solution is more practical. Use of other heuristic methods, like Simulated Annealing to solve the optimization problem are future extensions to this work. Deciding how to schedule the SekGens in the network, so that parallel such executions can be performed, is a related problem.
